Fill in the blank in accord with one of indications – w for a single word, p for a phrase or a few words, and s for a sentence. Some recurring numbers are for completing a sentence. Though there is no need to write the answers again, recurring answers must fit all the sentences in which they occur. 1. Q. There are 3 types of knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance, performative knowledge and (1-p). Philosophers have traditionally thought of (1-p)’s definition as (2-p), but an American philosopher whose name is (3-w) showed counterexamples of the traditional definition. 2. Q. Due to the differences in the views about the sources and means of knowledge, there have been historically 2 major groups of philosophers. (4-w) maintains that (5-s), whereas (6-w) claims that (7-s). The difference between them can be seen along with their stances in 3 important distinctions, (8-p) concerning the way of acquiring knowledge and the role of experience in so doing, (9-p) related to the nature of resulting propositions and (10-p) pertaining to the nature of true propositions. 3. Q. There are different conceptions of truth. The (11-w) theory states that the truth value of a proposition is dependent on its (11-w) relation to reality. However, this theory can’t explain true propositions like mathematical, abstract or fictional ones. 4. Q. Based on the argument from illusion, some philosophers criticize the Direct or Naïve realism and argue instead for (12-p). One of the famous is an English philosopher, (13-w) who says that we are all shrouded by our ideas/sensations and call this (14-p). However, he argues that there is the external world and that we can have knowledge of the world due to the fact that ideas/sensations (15-w) the properties of objects in the external world. He also divides the sensations into two kinds, (16-p) including shape, extension, mobility etc. and (17-p) like color etc. 5. Q. However, based on cases like the Moon illusion, philosopher (18-w) claims that (13-w)’s distinction is wrong and that only (19-w) objects exist – Esse est percipi. 6. Q. This Ancient Greek philosopher, (20-w), presented a synthesis of two philosophers’ views about change. He believed that only that which is unchanging is real like (21-w) but that, like (22-w), what is presented to our senses is constantly changing. The imaginary story, (23-p), which illustrates his view well, talks about prisoners in captivity but suggests that what we experience is just the appearance of (24w) that is immaterial, universal, the cause of appearance and the object of our (25-w) knowledge. 7. Q. A French philosopher, (26-w), thought that knowledge must be absolutely certain. To achieve this kind of knowledge, he used a method, (27-p) and checked whether there is any general foundational method for the acquisition of knowledge. He argued that two arguments, (28-p) and (29-p), show that one cannot rely on experience and that (30-p) discredits mathematical certainty/reasoning. However, he found that (31-p) passes (30-p) and provides the foundation of knowledge. However, he had to use the principle of (32-p) which means that (33-s) and this was fallacious because (34-s). 8. Q. A Scottish philosopher, (35-w), presented the criteria that empiricists of 17th century believed stating that (36-s). Then, he realized that there are two important epistemic principles here in the program, (37-w) and (38-w). (37-w) assumes that there are specific features of the relation between events, i.e., priority, contiguity and (39-p). But he argued that (39-p) is not justifiable due to the criteria. Further he claimed that when one applies (37-w) to other events, one has to rely on (38-w) whose fundamental assumption is that (40-s) which is also unjustifiable. Therefore, two epistemic principles fail. However, this does not mean that we cannot have knowledge about the world. To explain this new possibility of knowledge, he said that one can form the understanding of (37-w) through significant amount experiences of (41-s). This relies on a principle of human nature and he calls (42-w). 9. Q. A German philosopher, (43-w), thought that the two historical programs of epistemology failed because they failed to see that there are (44-p) judgments. He called his finding (45-p) comparable to a famous scientific achievement in the sense that in order to know the external world, we need to experience it but we can’t experience it without (46-w) or (47-w), which are not discovered in the world but present in (48-w). Therefore, this world, (49-p), we experience is the one constructed by (48-w) and things in themselves or (50-p) .