Can you coherently believe that eliminativism about beliefs is true?

What does it mean to say that mental processes are computational? Is it true?
April 4, 2023
What is it for a belief to be epistemically justified?
April 4, 2023

Can you coherently believe that eliminativism about beliefs is true?

1 ‘Since all perceptual experience involves psychological and physiological
processing, it makes no sense to regard perception as “direct”‘. Discuss.
2 ‘A Belief is justified if formed by a reliable method.’ Discuss.
3 Either (a) Could truth be a form of correspondence?
Or (b) Does a deflationary theory account for the normativity
of truth?
4 Either (a) ‘The definitive characteristic of any sort of experience as
such is its causal role. But these causal roles which belong by analytic
necessity to experiences are occupied in fact by certain physical states.’
Discuss.
Or (b) ‘Pain might have been distinct from C-fibre stimulation. Pain
might not have been distinct from pain. Therefore pain is distinct from
C-fibre stimulation.’ Discuss.
5 ‘A computer could never have a mind because a computer could never
have experiences and experiences are essential to having a mind.’
Discuss.
6 ‘All qualities are dispositions to produce experiences of some kind;
therefore there is no clear primary/secondary quality distinction.’ Discuss.
7 Can you coherently believe that eliminativism about beliefs is true?
8 What is a priori knowledge? Is there any?
9 Is there a compelling reason for thinking that either foundationalism or
coherentism about justification must be true?
10 Is it a scandal to philosophy that nobody has proved that the external
world exists?