1. ‘If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, we
ought, morally, to do it.’ Is it a good objection to this principle that to
live by it would be profoundly disruptive to cherished personal projects?
2. Can we compare small harms to many with large harms to few?
3. EITHER (a) ‘Contractualists cannot give a satisfactory account of
promissory obligation because they must presuppose it.’ Discuss.
OR (b) ‘The practice of promising is justified by its use to society.’
Discuss.
4. Do sentimentalists provide too contingent a foundation for morality?
5. ‘Only rationalists can provide an extensionally adequate account of
moral obligation.’ Discuss.
6. Should a theist be a voluntarist about moral obligation?
7. ‘A has reason to φ iff A would be motivated to φ if A were to deliberate
rationally and were fully informed.’ Discuss.
8. ‘If present sacrifice for future benefit is rational, so is sacrifice of one
person’s good for the sake of another’s.’ Discuss.
9. EITHER (a) Why might we be responsible for being weak willed?
OR (b) ‘The akratic person abandons rational calculation.’ Why does
this not simply count as vice or ignorance?
10. EITHER (a) Is the fact that virtue is rare a good response to the
situationist challenge?
OR (b) Are there any viable action-guiding principles in virtue ethics?