1. Do we have privileged access to our own mental states?
2. We can think about things that don’t exist. Does this mean intentionality
cannot be reductively explained?
3. Do our ascriptions of mental states to others presuppose acts of mental
simulation?
4. If I don’t know what water is, can I think about water?
5. EITHER: (a) It seems that there are some things it is impossible to learn
from books. What, if anything, does this tell us about the nature of
consciousness?
OR: (b) If physicalism were true, would zombies be inconceivable? Are
they?
6. Can one intend to do something whilst believing one won’t do it?
7. ‘When I attend to my experiences, I end up attending to objects and
properties outside my head. So, my experiences represent objects and
properties outside my head.’ Is this a sound argument for
representationalism about consciousness?
8. Is there anything to the imagination besides mental images?
9. ‘If John could not think first-person thoughts, he could not act for selfish
reasons.’ Is this true?
10. Under what conditions do two conscious experiences belong to the same
mind?