1. Are desire-fulfillment theories of welfare compatible with interpersonal
welfare comparisons?
2. Would it be better if there were a small number of happy people or a
larger number of less happy people?
3. Does the possibility of a rational Caligula refute meta-ethical
constructivism?
4. How, if at all, do the non-moral properties of an action determine its
moral properties?
5. What, if anything, is wrong with moral deference?
6. ‘May I not, when I am hard pressed, make a promise with the intention
of not keeping it?’ (KANT). Evaluate Kant’s answer to this question in
the Groundwork.
7. How can freedom consist of being under moral law?
8. Does friendship provide special reasons for trust?
9. Can we be morally required to forgive someone who has wronged us?
10. Is the purpose of blame to inspire remorse?