1. Should an empiricist about meaning distinguish between matters of fact
and matters of meaning?
2. Should a theory of truth accommodate declarative sentences that are
neither true nor false? If so, how?
3. EITHER: (a) Is there a sharp distinction between formal and material
validity?
OR: (b) Describe and assess Davidson’s account of logical form.
4. Is the sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ about the words ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’?
5. Must definite descriptions be treated as quantifier phrases?
6. Must a reference-fixing use of a name be intentional?
7. Describe a semantics in terms of Kripke models for the modal logic S5.
Provide a proof system for S5 and argue that it is sound with respect to
the semantics.
8. Must logical expressions be governed by harmonious rules?
9. ‘Frege’s criticisms of Hilbert are unsuccessful since Frege and Hilbert
mean different things by “axiom”, “definition” and related terms.’ Do you
agree?
10. Prove the collective expressive adequacy of conjunction, negation and
disjunction. Show that there are exactly two two-place connectives which
are individually expressively adequate.