1. Can the distinction between primary and secondary qualities be understood
wholly in terms of response dependence?
2. What is evidence?
3. EITHER: (a) Can truth-tracking conditions, such as safety or sensitivity,
provide the basis for a successful analysis of knowledge?
OR: (b) Is knowledge unanalyzable?
4. Can we avoid scepticism by ignoring it?
5. Should the internalist be more troubled than the externalist by scepticism?
6. What would we lose if we couldn’t talk about truth?
7. Many theories of truth hold that ‘Eating people is wrong’ is equivalent to
‘“Eating people is wrong” is true’. Are such theories committed to thinking
that moral realism is trivially true?
8. EITHER: (a) Does formalization reveal our commitments?
OR: (b) Might ‘nothing’ denote nothing?
9 ‘The saintly crusader, who would like to live in a world without avoidable
misery, is something like the snob who would like to live in a better part of
town … The crusader wants to be in a nice part of logical space, whereas
the snob wants to be in a nice part of ordinary space.’ Is this a decisive
objection to modal realism?
10. What would it mean for modality to be a fiction?