1. Do objections to hedonist theories of well-being rest on mistaken
intuitions?
2. ‘Being desire-satisfying is not a good-making property. Therefore, wellbeing cannot consist in the satisfaction of desires.’ Is this a good
argument?
3. What, if anything, do fitting-attitude accounts of value explain?
4. Does Sidgwick provide a convincing argument against the view that
virtue is the ultimate good?
5. EITHER (a) Can moral naturalists satisfactorily explain moral
disagreement?
OR (b) Does the supervenience of moral properties on non-moral
properties provide a decisive argument against moral non-naturalism?
6. ‘It is no more challenging to provide a theory of moral properties than it
is to provide a theory of epistemological properties.’ Discuss.
7. ‘A good will is not good…because of its fitness to attain some proposed
end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself.’ (KANT).
Does it follow from this claim that there is no such thing as moral luck?
8. EITHER (a) ‘Kant’s formula of humanity is too open-ended to be useful
in everyday life.’ Discuss.
OR (b) Does sex necessarily involve some degree of objectification?
Would it be a problem if it did?
9. ‘Someone is to blame just in case the reasons for which they act reveal
them to have attitudes that impair their relations with others.’ Discuss.
10. Does implicit bias tell us anything interesting about the nature of
justice?