1. Does the conceivability of zombies entail the falsity of physicalist theories
of phenomenal consciousness?
2. Are there any plausible non-physicalist theories of phenomenal
consciousness?
3. ‘No physical state is essentially painful, so no physical state can be pain.’
How plausible is this?
4. If mental states aren’t identified with physical ones, how can they have
any causal effects?
5. EITHER (a) ‘I believe I want a drink.’ Could the speaker be wrong?
OR (b) ‘I discover whether I believe that p by asking myself whether p.’ Is
this a plausible account of how we know our own beliefs? Does it
generalize to other mental states?
6. Can you know on the basis of perception that someone else is angry?
7. ‘Putnam thought the example of XYZ showed that reference is a causal
relation. But we are not in a causal relation to XYZ. So Putnam’s
premises are meaningful only if his conclusion is false.’ Discuss.
8. What are thoughts about Pegasus about?
9. Are beliefs and desires the only mental states one needs to explain
action?
10. EITHER (a) ‘All that’s the matter with addicts is that they don’t want to
stop badly enough.’ Discuss.
OR (b) ‘You show what you really think by what you do.’ How effective is
this as a response to the problem of akrasia?