1. If we can think about things that do not exist, does this mean that the
externalist view of intentionality is incorrect?
2. Are all intentional states of mind propositional attitudes?
3. EITHER (a) To what extent is the simulation theory an improvement on the
view that we acquire knowledge of other minds by drawing analogies with
our own case?
OR (b) Can someone consistently doubt whether any of their judgments
about other minds constitute knowledge, whilst remaining confident that
their judgments about the rest of the external world do?
4. ‘Perceptual experiences have no introspectible features over and above
those implicated in their intentional contents. So the phenomenal
character of such experiences is identical with, or determined by, their
intentional content.’ Discuss.
5. Does phenomenal consciousness require thoughts about one’s own
mental states?
6. Suppose a scientist omniscient about all the scientific facts sees red for
the first time. Does she learn something new? If so, is it a new fact, or
does she simply acquire a new concept to represent a fact she already
knew, or neither?
7. Ed thinks that he believes World War II ended in 1945. Could Jane know
that he doesnʼt believe this?
8. Is first-person knowledge knowledge of first-person facts?
9. Can the functionalist theory of the mind give an adequate account of
mental causation?
10. ʻIntending to do something is really a kind of desire.ʼ Discuss.
11. For whom is the problem of akrasia a problem?