1. Do I understand the minds of others by applying a theory of mind?
2. Suppose I see someone in the mirror and I suddenly realise that it is
me. What kind of truth have I learned, and what are the
consequences, if any, of someone’s learning such truths?
3. Evaluate the claim that I know what I’m thinking in a way that no one
else does.
4. ‘Someone could know all the physical facts about seeing red and yet
learn something new when he or she sees red for the first time.’ Is this
true? If so, what consequences does it have for an account of
consciousness?
5. What does it mean to say that the phenomenal character of an
experience is determined by its intentional content? Is it true?
6. EITHER: a) ‘The object of a thought is what the thought is about. Since
every thought is about something, every thought has an object. But
since we can think about things that do not exist, there must therefore
be non-existent objects.’ Evaluate this argument.
OR: b) What are propositional attitudes? Are all intentional states
propositional attitudes?
7. Are there any thoughts whose existence and nature depend essentially
on how things are in the world external to the thinker?
8. ‘Thoughts must have a structure; but their structure need not be
anything like the structure of a language.’ Discuss.
9. Can mental representation or intentionality be explained in non-mental
terms?
10.‘Only an identification of mental and physical causes can give an
account of mental causation which is acceptable to physicalists.’
Discuss.
*11.Explain the significance, if any, of Wittgenstein’s private language
argument for theories of consciousness and/or intentionality.