Are there good reasons to believe that phenomenal properties are nonphysical?

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Are there good reasons to believe that phenomenal properties are nonphysical?

1. ‘Externalism about mental content is incompatible with realism about
psychological explanation.’ Do you agree?
2. In what ways, if any, is weakness of will puzzling?
3. Are there good reasons to believe that phenomenal properties are nonphysical?
4. ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe
that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering
the question whether p.’ Is this true?
5. ‘All conscious mental states are represented.’ Discuss.
6. In what sense, if any, do perceptual experiences have content?
7. Does mindreading depend on possessing a theory of how minds work?
8. ‘There is no way of knowing whether phenomenal consciousness
overflows access consciousness.’ Do you agree?
9. I have never skated, but I can imagine I am a fantastic figure skater.
What, if anything, can I learn from this about my figure-skating abilities?
10.‘All representation is either mental representation or derived from mental
representation.’ Discuss.