1. Literature review

1.1. Modern migrations: between voluntary and forced migration

Migration is certainly not a new phenomenon, despite being a key social issue in current European politics on a local, national and transnational level and one that is currently attracting greater attention from researchers (Korkut, Bucken-Knapp & McGarry, 2013). Migration is a changeless feature of the entire history of human beings. However, as suggested by Korkut, et al (2013), the circular influence between the various parts composing the migration conundrum – political discourses, states’ immigration policies, public institutions and organizations working with immigrants – is far from being clarified. Williams and Graham (2014) explain that modern migratory movements produced social transformations that are changing the conception of migration itself. The new technological developments make movements easier extending people possibilities beyond the physical edges of their countries (Williams & Graham, 2014). The recent flow reflects also a world marked by strong imbalances of power and one of the reasons pushing people to leave their home is the effort to escape from disadvantaged condition: poverty, armed conflicts, racism and intolerance, group discrimination, persecution, lack of democracy and violations of civil and political rights. Migrants such as refugees and all those that are “forced” to leave their birthplaces are vulnerable to all sorts of human rights violations (Williams & Graham, 2014). Following the Second World War, in 1950, in order to assist these particularly disadvantaged categories of migrants, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been founded (Reed, Ludwig & Braslow, 2016). On 28 July 1951, the Refugee Convention (RC) has been approved. Based on Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it recognizes the right to seek asylum from persecution in other countries. Article 1A define who can be considered a refugee (Behrman, 2014):

[A refugee is a person who] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (UNHCR, 1951).

Hailbronner & Thym (2016) states that nowadays many asylum seekers are fleeing from indiscriminate violence or civil wars while others try to access to the asylum system for economic reasons. Migration flows are now characterized by a complexity of factors, mostly not considered by the 1951 RC making more problematic to discriminate between those avoiding direct persecution and those departing from economies destroyed by centuries of exploitation (Hailbronner & Thym, 2016). The European law tried to overcome this problem instituting a status of “subsidiary protection”, a different typology of international protection for those seeking asylum without the requirements of pure refugees (Hailbronner & Thym, 2016)..

It is important to refer to two terms referring to two intrinsically connected phenomena: voluntary migration (usually economically motivated) and forced migration (FMO, 2012). These categories are not sharply divided by clear boundaries, but rather by dim ones (Reed, Ludwig & Braslow, 2016), and recently the two phenomena are gradually fusing into each other. This conceptual overlap determines a space of uncertainty to both theoretical and political level of analysis (Reed, Ludwig & Braslow, 2016; see also Koser & Martin 2011). The term “Forced migration”, generally denote the directly coerced movement of people from their home region but, as UNHCR states in its website , it is not a concept with legal validity. Furthermore, even what is believed to be a voluntary migration could be the consequence of indirect coercion when structural inequalities, between poor and rich countries, “force” some groups to abandon their homelands (Zetter, 2007).

According to Alden Speare (1974), migration should be considered “forced” exclusively when a person is physically transported from a place to another without any chance to escape, suggesting that every form of migration contains an element of voluntariness. However, this statement is easily questionable arguing that in most cases the movements are connected to unbalanced social structures and people have any power to counteract. One of the differences between voluntary and forced migration is the presence or absence of direct violence causing the displacement of individuals and populations. This distinction, commonly related with the definition of a refugee, tends to put emphasis on a narrow conception of violence. However, if we consider Galtung’s definition, the element of violence can further obfuscate the boundaries between the two categories of migration. For Galtung (1969), in fact, violence exists in every situation where “human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (p.168). Hence, violence is basically a violation to human needs of survival, welfare, identity and freedom (Galtung, 1996) and it can be exerted structurally, directly and culturally. If we accept this broader conception of violence almost every form of migration is, even with different grades, “forced”, reversing Speare’s definition. Recently, the concept of forced migration has been extended to include a larger range of push factors, resulting in the production of countless labels (Reed, Ludwig & Braslow, 2016). It is possible to distinguish between at least four different forms of forced migration that sometimes can be combined between them (FMO 2012): conflict-inducted displacement; environmental- or disaster-induced displacement; development-induced displacement; human trafficking. To these typologies of forced migration, it could be added the “population transfer”, a type of forced migration caused by a clear project to move undesirable large groups of people, for example as an attempt of “ethnic cleansing” (see the Palestinian case: Pappè, 2007; Reed, Ludwig & Braslow, 2016).

As stated by Richmond (1988),the actual situation is so intricate that drawing clear distinctions between economic and forced migration is almost impossible. However, it is important to stress the idea that, while every refugee is a forced migrant, not every forced migrant is a refugee. As Zetter (2007) suggest, the term “refugee” is now used to label almost every forced migrant: “environmental refugees”, “tsunami refugees” and “development refugees” are just a few examples of this trend (Zetter, 2007). From a sociological perspective (Stepputat & Nyberg Sorensen, 2014; see also Wood 1985), labelling can be seen as: (i) an instrumental process used to construct the world in convenient images (Zetter, 2007) that, reflecting specific power relations, affect identity formation and individuals’ life (Zetter 2007; Polzer 2008); and (ii) a device of state performance handled by bureaucracies (Stepputat & Nyberg Sorensen, 2014). As Polzer (2008) argues, grouping individuals through categories is a basic process to give order to the social world and act within it. Although the literature has highlighted how individuals can resist and move from one label to another, the labelling process has the force to objectify people, detach them from their individual stories, converting them “into standardized ‘cases’, and ‘re-linking’ them to the institutions that administer the labelling and the actions that depend on this process” (Stepputat & Nyberg Sorensen, 2014; p.89). These authors suggest that the modern transformation of refugee label is motivated by governments’ effort of protecting the north-south status quo. Consequently, the label become politicized “by the process of bureaucratic fractioning which reproduces itself in populist and largely pejorative labels” and “by legitimizing and presenting a wider political discourse of resistance to refugees and migrants as merely an apolitical set of bureaucratic categories” (Zetter, 2007; p.174). Zetter’s theory (2007) about bureaucratical labelling, argue that the nature of the label “refugee” reflects a pattern of forced migration that is “fractioned” by institutions to manage the modern migration flows.

The epistemological starting point of this work, founded in socio-constructionism, assumes that people create their understanding of the world discursively and language shape meanings and actions (Gergen 1985). The recent migratory flows in Europe have been defined as a “refugee crisis” where governments and institutions, having power to design and apply immigration policies, turn discourses into political actions. Media, groups of interests and world leaders have constantly referred to this situation as a “crisis”, contributing to the shaping and sharing of this idea (Smith, 2016). Individuals have changed their perception about the arrival of refugees in Europe, perceived as a threat to security and national cultures, intensifying the competition within a weak EU labour market (Hatton, 2016a). According to Gjerde (2004), societies are structured upon a set of discourses sited in public domains or institutions (i.e. science, religion, education, governments and the media). The ontological instability of these discourses consents the strongest groups to promote their own meanings and representations to pursue their political agenda (Gjerde, 2004). This influence can be used to protect social divisions and status quo through political activity. As Louis Althusser (1970, 2004; see also Smith, 2016) has argued, ideas and concepts within capitalist societies are constructed by joint intervention of governments and non-governmental organizations. These organizations, contribute to the construction of social discourses, in this case concerning the “refugee/immigration crisis”, driving the construction of policies and social representations and labels (Smith, 2016). Hereafter, as Smith (2016) proposes, it is possible to argue that the solutions offered to migrants and refugees and the way they have been represented and treated in the EU, can be connected to the construction of a “refugee crisis” discourse.

1.2. The “refugee crisis” in Europe

Throughout the last 10 years, the growing migration flows issue have become increasingly salient within the political agendas of governments and in public discourse of most Western European countries. The wave of migrants and refugees increased gradually, due to events such civil wars in Africa and Syria, or the fight against IS and terrorism (Mulack, 2016). Pictures and videos of people walking in post-apocalyptic landscapes, overcrowded ships transporting hundreds of individuals, dead bodies lying on the shores of Mediterranean countries such as Greece and Italy have been used by political parties to ignite racism or fears, or to seek support in attempting to alleviate cruelty or end the exodus (Achilli, 2016). Constant and Zimmermann (2016), suggest that these events triggered a series of consequences compromising European Union’s agreements: closing of borders, inhuman treatment in detention camps, Brexit, resentment and opposition. The European Commission called the recent migration movement to the EU the “largest global humanitarian crisis” of our time (ECHO 2015, 1; cit. in Holmes & Castaneda, 2016) and Angela Merkel (the German chancellor) asserted that “the contemporary crisis will define this decade” (UK Guardian, August 15, 2015 ; cit. in Holmes & Castaneda 2016) and in 2015 called for mutual help by all European countries proposing a quota system which would see refugees fairly distributed among all 28 EU states. (UK Guardian, September 2, 2015 ). In 2016, Germany has changed its position and moved on to harden its asylum policies, following Finland and Sweden’s plan to expel 80,000 immigrants (UK Guardian, January 28, 2016 ).

This is considered the largest refugee crisis of modern times, with more than 4 million Syrians leaving their country and 6 million of internally displaced persons (IDPs). From the beginning of the Syria’s civil war in 2011, a number of people between 450,000 and 700,000 have requested protection in Europe (Achilli, 2016; Holmes & Castaneda, 2016; UNCHR, 2015). Only in 2015, as Holmes and Castaneda (2016) point out, more than 500,000 migrants from Africa have landed on Mediterranean’s states and numbers are expected to grow. The attention of the media remains focused on the European situation, while this crisis is triggering a chain reaction in those countries adjoining Syria, already hosting around 4.5 million refugees (Mulack, 2016): Lebanon, Iran, Turkey and Jordan are responding by periodically closing borders or introducing tougher policies towards refugees limiting their rights to access to employment, health and educational services and opportunities in general (Achilli, 2016; Al-Qdah & Lacroix, 2011). As Holmes and Castaneda (2016) state, the incoming flows to Europe are going to increase and, according to some estimations, over 1 million more migrants are yet to reach European countries. While a concrete strategy to solve this situation seems far from being reached, the reaction from European Union States, as argued by Zizek (2016), is taking the form of a double-sided narrative dilemma expressing two polarized positions: the left liberals side suggest that we should help refugees as much as possible; the anti-immigration populist side propose to close the borders and protect our way of life (Zizek, 2016). According to Zizek, both suggestions are not feasible and, if European states will continue to consider and treat refugees as objects of humanitarian help the situation will get worse quickly in both refugees’ homelands and Europe (Zizek, 2016).

1.3. The Common European Asylum System

One of the biggest debates amongst European governments revived by the arrivals of refugees, is around the problem of “burden-sharing” (Hatton, 2016c). The origin of the term is to be found inside the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention, which states that granting asylum may place a load of responsibilities (burdens) on certain countries, suggesting that, for a good management of the situation, international co-operation should be the answer (Reed, Ludwig & Braslow, 2016). While academic and political debate focused mainly on the financial and physical features of the burden sharing (Betts, 2010; Hatton 2016c; Reed, Ludwig & Braslow, 2016; Thielemann, 2003; Zetter, 2007), the uneven distribution of responsibilities for the reception and hospitality of migrants raises concerns about the increasing cultural diversity and the integration of migrant communities within the European states (Bauböck & Scholten, 2016). Some shortages within the current Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have stimulated the debate. The CEAS, encouraging migrants’ odyssey to reach Europe and seek for protection, caused an irregular distribution of asylum applications across EU Countries (see Hatton, 2016b, 2016c; Constant & Zimmermann, 2016). A strong weakness of both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the CEAS is one of their sustaining concepts that postulate that refugee protection should be a provisional status though it has often become permanent (Hilpold, 2017).

Shared by almost every country in the world, the 1951 Refugee Convention (RC) and the 1967 Protocol, state that everybody has the right to seek for asylum and protection in another country (Constant & Zimmermann, 2016). Moreover, outlining the rights of refugees and displaced people, these agreements set the responsibilities that host countries must entail to protect them (Hatton, 2016b). The claims for protection must be judged individually and asylum applicants must not be sent back where their basic rights would be threatened: this point is called the “non-refoulement” principle (Article 33) (Constant & Zimmermann, 2016). Moreover, illegal access into a state should not impact on the outcome of an asylum claim so there is no limit to the number of individuals that a destination country can receive (Hatton, 2016c).

These treaties have favoured an irregular distribution of asylum applications and an overload of arrivals to some countries (Constant & Zimmermann, 2016). These asymmetries are determined by various pull factors: the presence of fellow communities of refugees in the territory; cultural and linguistic affinity; the easiness of access for geographic reasons; the presence of advantageous rules for admission; the economic attractiveness of specific countries (Neumayer 2004; Hatton, 2016c; Rossi & Vitali, 2014). As highlighted by Hatton (2016c), the RC grants a great freedom to national governments to apply immigration policies that may discourage asylum claimants, further worsening an imbalanced burden distribution.

At a European level, the CEAS ensure a certain degree of homogeneity among all member states concerning the rules and procedures for the management of asylum seekers. With the establishment of minimum reception standards, the EU wanted to reduce the effect of pull factors affecting those EU countries that had to cope with the mass arrival of asylum claimants and control the successive patterns of secondary migration (Sigona, 2005). The CEAS is currently divided into three main areas : The Asylum Procedures Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive and the Qualification Directive (EU, 2014). The first area disciplines the entire iter of the application for Asylum. The directive on Reception Condition concerns the access to reception services for asylum seekers. Finally, the Qualification directive establish a common ground for granting international protection and the common standards of living conditions for its beneficiaries: it assures the residence permits, travel documents, access to housing, food, employment, education, social welfare and healthcare in every Member State (EU, 2014). The CEAS also comprise the Dublin Regulation and the fingerprint database called EURODAC (EU, 2014). The Dublin Regulation affirms that the first Member Country in which the asylum-seeker enters is the responsible for the examination of asylum applications and should foster integration after an international protection has been granted (Rossi & Vitali, 2014). Moreover, it states that the residency permit applies only within the State that acknowledged the asylum claim: this should prevent the “asylum shopping” occ