1. Should epistemic peers suspend judgment where they disagree?
2. Can there be non-analytic a priori knowledge? If so, how?
3. Are internalists about justification committed to scepticism about many
of our everyday beliefs? If so, is this a problem for them?
4. ‘If externalism about justification is true, then the justification of an
agent’s beliefs can depend on factors of which the agent is unaware.
So externalism about justification is false.’ Discuss.
5. Is there any good reason to think that knowledge is unanalysable?
6. EITHER (a) ‘The argument from illusion shows that we cannot perceive
the mind-independent world.’ Discuss.
OR
(b) ‘Because we directly perceive sense-data, we don’t directly
perceive mind-independent objects.’ Discuss.
7. Do sceptical arguments make unreasonable assumptions about
knowledge?
8. Suppose you believe that p. Do practical interests influence whether
you also know that p?
9. Are there any decisive objections to dispositionalism about colour?
10. ‘Any plausible version of fictionalism about possible worlds will end up
having the same ontological commitments as views which hold that
worlds are abstract objects.’ Discuss.