1 Is there an important distinction to be made between being conscious as
such, and being conscious of something?
2 Could consciousness be physical without having a physicalist
explanation?
3 Either (a) ‘If the mind were not itself physical, it could have no
physical effects.’ Discuss.
Or (b) ‘All forms of physicalism are reductive in one way or
another.’ Discuss.
4 Can there be thought without language?
5 Can there be an explanation of intentionality in causal or nomological
terms?
6 What is meant by ‘intentional content’? Critically examine the thesis that
sensations are distinguished from other mental states on the grounds of
not having intentional content.
7 ‘Everyone is presented to themselves in a way that they are presented to
no-one else.’ What does this mean? Is it true?
8 Does what I am thinking determine what I am thinking about?
9 Is the functionalist doctrine that mental states are distinguished by their
causal roles incompatible with the doctrine that such states are identical
with states of the brain?
*10 What does Wittgenstein mean by a ‘private language’? Does he provide a
persuasive argument against the possibility of such a language?
11 Either (a) ‘To understand other minds one needs a good imagination,
not a good theory.’ Discuss.
Or (b) ‘The so-called “simulation-theory” is just a fancier version
of the argument from analogy.’ Discuss.
*12 What changes when I shift from seeing the duck-rabbit picture as a duck
picture to seeing it as a rabbit picture? Does the possibility of such shifts
tell us anything about seeing?