1 ‘When I was in circumstances C, I decided to do F; Hero is in
circumstances C; so Hero will decide to do F.’ Is this a good kind of
argument?
2 ‘The extreme complexity of the mind makes it unlikely that our
understanding of mental states is based on theory.’ Discuss.
3 When I become aware of my own mental state, for example that I am a
little hungry, am I thereby aware of myself?
4 ‘The word “I” expresses an indexical concept; so understanding how
indexical judgments are based is the key to understanding first person
knowledge.’ Discuss.
5 Either (a) Critically assess the view that phenomenal consciousness
is a form of mental representation.
Or (b) What is meant by ‘phenomenal consciousness’? Is
phenomenal consciousness just one kind of consciousness among
others?
6 Should thinking be understood as a relation between a thinker and the
object(s) of their thought?
7 ‘Even if thoughts are in the head, meanings are not.’ Discuss.
8 Either (a) What might be meant by saying that some concepts are
simple and others are complex? Are there any simple concepts?
Or (b) Is it essential to the conceptual content of thought that it
has a compositional structure?
9 What kinds of thoughts, if any, can beings without a language have?
10 ‘Non-reductive physicalists cannot make room for the causal efficacy of
mental properties.’ Discuss.
*11 ‘Only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only
surmise it. — In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense.’
(WITTGENSTEIN) Discuss.
*12 Why can’t a dog simulate pain? Is it too honest?